The Anonymity of Juries
The Anonymity of JuriesAbstract
The American criminal justice system has traditionally made
the identities and addresses of jurors known to the judge, the
prosecution, and the defense. That tradition began to erode with the
unprecedented sua sponte trial court decision to use an anonymous jury
in the case of United States v. Barnes, a highly publicized criminal
trial of notorious organized crime figures in New York City. Since
"Barnes," Federal prosecutors in New York have requested and been
granted anonymous juries in a number of similar cases, a development
which has generated criticism. This paper first addresses the issue of
whether juror anonymity violates a defendant's sixth amendment right
to a jury trial by adversely affecting the defendant's ability to
exercise effectively peremptory challenges during voir dire. It also
discusses the effect an anonymous jury may have on the presumption
that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Also considered are
attempts by trial judges, through particular jury instructions, to
minimize or eliminate prejudice to defendants resulting from the use
of an anonymous jury. And finally the paper examines the need for
anonymous juries and concludes that in certain cases jurors may either
fear retaliation or actually be exposed to intimidation unless the
court employs measures to conceal their identities.
Introduction
Juror anonymity is an innovation that was unknown to the
common law and to American jurisprudence in its first two centuries.
Anonymity was first employed in federal prosecutions of organized
crime in New York in the 1980's. Although anonymous juries are unusual
since they are typically only empanelled in organized-crime cases, its
use has spread more recently to widely publicized cases such as the
federal prosecution of police officers accused of beating Rodney King;
and the trial of those accused of the World Trade Center bombing.
In these cases, attorneys selected a jury from a panel of
prospective jurors whose names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds and
religous affiliations remain unknown to either side. This unusual
procedure, designed to protect jurors from outside influence and the
fear of retaliation, has occasionally been used in New York federal
courts since the trial of drug kingpin Leroy "Nicky" Barnes.1 Despite
apparent benefits, critics assail anonymous juries both as an
infringment of the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury 2
and as a serious and unnecessary erosion of the presumption of
innocence.3
Since many attorneys believe trials are frequently won or lost
during jury selection,4 any procedure diminishing the role of counsel
invites close scrutiny and criticism. Opponents of anonymous juries
argue that the procedure restricts meaningful voir dire and thereby
undermines the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury.5 Critics also claim that jurors interpret their anonymity as
proof of the defendant's criminal proclivity, thereby subverting the
presumption of innocence.6 Nevertheless, this paper argues that
anonymous juries neither undermine the sixth amendment nor
meaningfully dilute the presumption of...
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